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Expressive Rights for Shareholders After
Citizens United?
By REZA DIBADJ*
To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propa-
gation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.
—Thomas Jefferson1
Introduction
ON JANUARY 21, 2010, in a 5-4 opinion, Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission2 struck down section 203 of the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).3 The BCRA prohibited corpora-
tions and unions from using general treasury funds for
“electioneering communications”—defined as broadcast, cable, or sat-
ellite communications that are publicly distributed4—within thirty
days of a primary election or sixty days of a general election and that
advocate for or against a particular candidate in a federal election.5
The vibrant commentary emerging from the opinion focuses, as one
might expect, on whether the majority correctly bestowed broad First
Amendment rights upon corporations and unions.6
This Article, however, emphasizes an undertheorized and often
overlooked issue that Citizens United, perhaps unwittingly, brings to the
fore: the First Amendment rights of shareholders. The core of my ar-
gument is simple: the opinion all but ignores shareholders’ rights,
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. I thank the editors of the University
of San Francisco Law Review for inviting me to participate in the Symposium “Democracy,
Inc? Citizens United, Corporate Expenditures, and the Future of Campaign Finance Law” in
San Francisco, CA on February 25, 2011.
1. Thomas Jefferson, 12 Hening’s Va. Stat. 85 (1823).
2. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
3. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
4. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a)(2) (2001).
5. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A).
6. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, No Middle Ground? Reflections on the Citizens United
Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV. 649 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of
Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011).
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and in doing so, is a signpost in the march away from shareholder
capitalism.
The argument is developed in two principal sections: Part I ex-
plores the fundamental problem in Citizens United—the oversized First
Amendment rights bestowed upon organizations such as corporations
and unions—and the thoughtful critiques that have emerged in re-
sponse to the majority’s bold rhetoric. Part II argues that sharehold-
ers, like union members, have First Amendment rights that are
trampled upon if corporations are given free reign to engage in politi-
cal speech. It concludes by responding to three powerful critiques of
the notion that shareholders should have free speech rights: (1) cor-
porate law already protects them; (2) they can simply divest their
holdings if they do not agree with the corporation’s speech; and (3)
corporations are not state actors against whom constitutional rights
may be asserted.7
I. Problems Citizens United Poses
Citizens United is ostensibly about a corporation’s “freedom of
speech.”8 As Samuel Issacharoff observes, “[t]he most striking and
perhaps the oddest feature of Citizens United is the extravagant endow-
ment of rights upon corporate actors . . . .”9 Not only is such a posture
difficult to support theoretically,10 it does not accord with basic com-
mon sense. After all, “unlike individuals, corporations are not voters
and so have no inherent right to influence elections.”11 Further,
“[a]rtificial legal entities do not assemble to protest, to hold signs, to
7. One important caveat is in order before proceeding: Given current fashion in
constitutional interpretation, I have no illusion that my proposal will be implemented
soon. My point, at least for now, is simply to foster discussion and debate.
8. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010) (“The Court has
recognized that First Amendment protections extend to corporations . . . . The Court has
thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations
should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations
are not ‘natural persons.’” (citations omitted)).
9. Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 130 (2010).
10. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1651
(1982) (“The notion that soulless, inarticulate corporations could even hold a political
view, let alone insist on the right to express it, would be incomprehensible to the scholastic
philosophers and the classical economists who provided the conceptual ground for earlier
explanations of corporate personality.”).
11. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and Elections, 4
CHARLESTON L. REV. 91, 126 (2009). As Justice Stevens laments, “[u]nder the majority’s
view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that corporations are not permitted
to vote, given that voting is, among other things, a form of speech.” Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sing songs, etc., though the few who rule them may hire people to do
these things. [Corporations] don’t speak or write either, though they
may hire people to do these things for them.”12  Thus, as various com-
mentators have noted over the years, treating corporations as natural
persons for constitutional purposes is illogical,13 inconsistent with
constitutional history,14 and bad public policy.15 As Justice Stevens re-
minds us in the dissent, the overall point is simple: “[t]he fact that
corporations are different from human beings might seem to need no
elaboration, except that the majority opinion almost completely elides
it.”16
A “corporation” is merely a legal fiction—a piece of paper that
cannot “speak.” In the words of one commentator, “[e]xpression is
possible only by natural persons, not by corporations. Only a natural
person may express himself through a political expenditure. Any ex-
penditure of corporate assets for political purposes must be an expres-
sion of the natural persons who authorize and direct the
expenditure.”17 As Victor Brudney presciently observed thirty years
ago, this reality “leaves to be solved the crucial questions of the state’s
12. Michael Kent Curtis, Citizens United and Davis v. FEC: Lochner on Steroids and De-
mocracy on Life Support 17 (Sept. 30, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=1685459).
13. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 35 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The insistence on treating identically for constitutional pur-
poses entities that are demonstrably different is as great a jurisprudential sin as treating
differently those entities which are the same.”). It becomes unsurprising, then, that the
initial sweeping grant of constitutional rights to corporations dates back to all of two
sentences from a Supreme Court headnote in 1886 that simply states: “The court does not
wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution . . . applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it
does.” Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
14. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 863 (2007) (“When the Founders established the principle of free
speech in both the Federal and state constitutions, corporate speech was far from their
minds.”).
15. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 6, at 96 (“Indeed, the size and power of corpora-
tions would more likely lead to the conclusion that corporations are a sector in need of
popular control rather than in need of actively participating in the political discourse.”).
16. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). As one scholar notes, “[s]emantic sleight-of-hand insufficiently justifies treating cor-
porations like human beings under the Constitution.” Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corpora-
tion and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 35 (2001).
17. Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and
Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347,
1351 (1979); see also id. at 1373.
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power to decide who, within the corporation, may authorize it to utter
that speech . . . .”18
Rather than explore Brudney’s question, the majority simply pos-
tulates that corporations should be conceptualized as “associations of
citizens.”19 Yet who are these “citizens”? One would be tempted to
posit shareholders; unfortunately, shareholders are not the constitu-
ency that decides upon the speech of large public corporations.20 As
those with even a passing familiarity with these entities will recognize,
corporate insiders—the board and management—determine what is
said.21 Allowing a “corporation” to speak enhances the power of cor-
porate insiders to use shareholders’ money:
Instead of “corporations” deciding to “speak,” a few in control of
the corporation will make the decision. Far from a “corporation”
“deciding” to spend “its” money for political purposes, the few will
decide to spend other people’s money (that of the shareholders or
money generated from creditors or customers, for example) in po-
litical causes the few choose to support. In effect, many customers
and shareholders will end up subsidizing political causes to which
they object.22
18. Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amend-
ment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 236, 248 (1981).
19. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 883; see also id. at 904 (“If the First Amendment has any
force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for
simply engaging in political speech.”). The associational notion also appears in Justice
Scalia’s concurrence. See, e.g., id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“All the provisions of the
Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individual men and women—not, for example, of trees
or polar bears. But the individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in
association with other individual persons.”).
20. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 12, at 18 (“The majority in Citizens United implied that
corporations were simply groups of citizens united for political purposes. That is not what
is going on. Shareholders do not typically unite for ideological reasons. Customers do not
typically buy products to support one candidate or oppose another.” (footnote omitted));
Joo, supra note 16, at 6 (“Because corporate election-related spending decisions are not
made in consultation with a corporation’s shareholders or other constituents, such spend-
ing does not constitute individual expression.”).
21. See, e.g., Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L.
REV. 223, 275 (1990) (“Nevertheless, corporations are not natural beings; when a corpora-
tion ‘speaks’ it speaks through the voice of its officers and directors, who are agents exer-
cising derivative power on behalf of their widely dispersed shareholder-principals.”).
22. Curtis, supra note 12, at 13 (footnote omitted); see also Joo, supra note 16, at 81
(“Shareholders (and other corporate constituents other than managers) have no meaning-
ful input into the decision-making process regarding election-related spending. Rather,
such spending is controlled by managers with no real accountability.”); O’Kelley, supra
note 17, at 1377 (“The expression in such a case is that of management, or whoever autho-
rizes and directs the expenditure. The individual shareholder has in no sense engaged in
an act of expression. He and the other shareholders have merely continued to hold shares
in the corporation from which management has, for its own expression, extracted assets.”).
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Or put succinctly in Adam Winkler’s words, “[m]anagement, not
shareholders, makes the determination of what to say, where to say it,
and how much to spend. In terms of substance, corporate speech is
really corporate management’s speech. Yet it is the shareholders who
pay for it.”23 Other commentators have echoed these significant
concerns.24
Privileging management’s political speech to the detriment of
shareholders’ speech presents at least two major problems. First, in-
creased corporate political activity is associated with poor corporate
governance and destruction of firm value25—creating, after Citizens
23. Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 165 (1998) [hereinafter
Winkler, Beyond Bellotti] (footnote omitted). Winkler even suggests that the concern over
misuse of “other people’s money” provided a prime impetus to regulate corporate electo-
ral speech. See Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Cam-
paign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 873 (2004) [hereinafter Winkler, “Other People’s
Money”] (“At the turn of the century, when Congress and the states first adopted bans,
corporate political contributions were also understood to be corrupt because they
amounted to a misuse of ‘other people’s money’: company executives were opportunisti-
cally misappropriating the company owners’ money to purchase legislation benefiting the
executives themselves.”).
24. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish’s The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 676 (1982) (“[D]emocratic
theory still would not justify granting corporate executives discretionary control over the
massive corporate resources, which were gathered for commercial purposes, in order to
pursue their political objectives.”); Andre´ Douglas Pond Cummings, Procuring ‘Justice’? Citi-
zens United, Caperton v. Massey, and Partisan Judicial Elections, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 89,
109 (2010), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_95_cummings.pdf
(“Now, corporate executives, who have proven reckless and negligent repeatedly, are now
able to freely assign corporate funds and shareholder value to campaigning and election-
eering. There is little evidence to suggest that these executives will be careful, thoughtful,
or responsible with the new ability to spend shareholder funds at their disposal.”); Carl J.
Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577,
656 (1990) (“Another broad objection to granting corporations Bill of Rights protections is
that to do so unfairly promotes the power of corporate managers while diminishing that of
shareholders, workers, and communities.”); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spend-
ing & Shareholders’ Rights: Why the U.S. Should Adopt the British Approach 44 (Feb. 28, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474421) (“The first risk
posed by total deregulation is that corporate managers who were restrained by the corpo-
rate [Political Action Committee] requirement will spend much more on politics—using
the corporate treasury as a personal piggy bank.”).
25. See John C. Coates IV, Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: What Effect
Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth? 16 (Harv. L. & Econ., Discussion Paper No.
684, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680861 (“In sum, not only does corpo-
rate political activity correlate with weak corporate governance, it also correlates (nega-
tively) with firm value. Firms with corporate governance provisions giving shareholders
more power engage in less political activity. Corporations that engage in political activity
generate lower value for their shareholders relative to the value of assets they control.”).
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United, new risks for investors.26 Second, giving corporations a politi-
cal voice actually forces shareholders who disagree with the corpora-
tion’s views to speak—a form of coerced expression.27 As Justice
Stevens eloquently notes in dissent:
When corporations use general treasury funds to praise or attack a
particular candidate for office, it is the shareholders, as the
residual claimants, who are effectively footing the bill. Those share-
holders who disagree with the corporation’s electoral message may
find their financial investments being used to undermine their po-
litical convictions.28
To be sure, one might try to address these concerns through the
securities and corporation laws by requiring, for example, that corpo-
rations disclose more fully their political spending29 or requiring
shareholders’ approval of such spending.30 Along these lines, Lucian
26. See Additional Discussion of H.R. 5175, the Disclose Act, Democracy Is Strengthened by
Casting Light on Spending in Elections: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong.
17, 18 (2010) (testimony of Professor John C. Coates IV, John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of
Law and Econ., Harvard Univ.) (“Put simply, Citizens United created a massive new risk for
investors in US companies, one that is not currently addressed in any meaningful way by
existing corporate governance mechanisms, or by state law, or by SEC regulations, or stock
exchange rules.”).
27. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 977 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“Interwoven with Austin’s concern to protect the integrity of
the electoral process is a concern to protect the rights of shareholders from a kind of
coerced speech . . . .”); Brudney, supra note 18, at 237 (“But the number of shareholders
who are likely to disagree with some of management’s political expenditures is not trivial
. . . .”).
28. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 810 (1978) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (“Corporate political expression, however, is not only divorced from the convictions
of individual corporate shareholders, but also, because of the ease with which corporations
are permitted to accumulate capital, bears no relation to the conviction with which the
ideas express are held by the communicator.”).
29. See, e.g., DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
30. For instance, Adam Winkler asks:
Can the corporation show that it has unanimous support from shareholders for
its electoral speech? If it can, and corruption stems from the misuse of sharehold-
ers’ money, it would be appropriate to allow an evidence-based exemption from
the general prohibition on general treasury funding. A law narrowly tailored to
meet the state’s interest in curbing other people’s money corruption would seem
to need an allowance for shareholder consent.
Such a requirement might also turn on the nature of the relevant corpora-
tion. A closely-held corporation may be able to surmount the difficulty associated
with unanimous shareholder consent with ease; a large publicly held corporation
will have considerably more trouble gaining unanimity.
Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, supra note 23, at 193. Rather than unanimity, Lucian Bebchuk and
Robert Jackson suggest a supermajority of shareholders approve political spending. See Lu-
cian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 83 (2010). See generally Brudney, supra note 18, at 264 (“Economic theory, as well as
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Bebchuk and Robert Jackson suggest that lawmakers consider adopt-
ing rules that:
(i) provide shareholders a role in determining the amount and
targets of corporate political spending; (ii) require that indepen-
dent directors oversee political speech decisions; (iii) allow share-
holders to opt out of—that is, either tighten or relax—each of
these first two rules; and (iv) mandate detailed and robust disclo-
sure to shareholders of the amounts and beneficiaries of a corpora-
tion’s political spending, whether made directly by the company or
indirectly through intermediaries.31
These proposals are thoughtful yet fall short. Thus, Part II argues a
more basic proposition: the First Amendment itself should protect
shareholders.
II. Ignored Shareholders
Shareholder interests have been ignored in the discussion about
corporations and their First Amendment rights. Here, I argue for
shareholders’ First Amendment rights and respond to possible objec-
tions to the acknowledgement of these rights.
A. A Case for Shareholders’ First Amendment Rights
When a corporation engages in political speech, its shareholders’
First Amendment rights are abridged. Phrased slightly differently,
shareholders, as individuals, should have a First Amendment right not
to speak: when a corporation makes a political statement, sharehold-
ers are effectively being coerced into speaking. Coerced speech vio-
lates the First Amendment.
Such a position remains undeveloped. A number of scholars have
even made at least passing reference to such a concept.32 For exam-
ple, in the dissent of Bellotti, Justice White observes that the “First
Amendment concerns of stockholders are directly implicated, how-
political science, suggests a legitimate government interest in requiring stockholder con-
sent for corporate political action.”).
31. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 30; see also Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 24, at 7
(“This paper is about changing the U.S. securities laws to require publicly traded corpora-
tions to report their political spending to their shareholders, as well as to require share-
holder authorization for corporate political spending before it is done.”).
32. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 30 (“Some might go further and argue
that shareholders, rather than corporations, are the actual bearers of the speech rights
described in Citizens United.”); Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-
Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 143
(2009) (“[I]t has been suggested that the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights
should be extended to shield individuals from corporate power.”); Torres-Spelliscy, supra
note 24, at 44 (“Furthermore, shareholders’ First Amendment rights could be trampled.”).
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ever, when a corporation chooses to use its privileged status to finance
ideological crusades which are unconnected with the corporate busi-
ness or property and which some shareholders might not wish to
support.”33
There is considerable Supreme Court precedent to support Jus-
tice White’s perspective. In West Virginia Board of Educators v. Barnette,
dating back to 1943, the Court ruled that the Free Speech Clause pro-
hibited a school board from forcing students to salute the flag and
recite the Pledge of Allegiance.34 More recently, in Harper & Row Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Court reiterated that:
The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit im-
proper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas . . . .
There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomi-
tant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ulti-
mate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.35
Perhaps of even greater interest is Pacific, Gas & Electric v. Public
Utilities Commission of California, which emphasized that even corpora-
tions have a right not to be coerced into speaking.36 The Court ruled
that the California Public Utilities Commission could not force a pub-
lic utility, Pacific Gas & Electric, to include a newsletter from third-
parties in its billing envelopes.37 As the opinion noted, “[c]ompelled
access like that ordered in this case both penalizes the expression of
particular points of view and forces speakers to alter their speech to
conform with an agenda they do not set.”38 After all, “[f]or corpora-
33. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 816 (White, J., dissenting). As Justice White noted with respect
to the state statute in question:
There is an additional overriding interest related to the prevention of corporate
domination which is substantially advanced by Massachusetts’ restrictions upon
corporate contributions: assuring that shareholders are not compelled to support
and financially further beliefs with which they disagree where, as is the case here,
the issue involved does not materially affect the business, property, or other af-
fairs of the corporation.
Id. at 812.
34. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“We think the action
of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”).
35. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (quot-
ing Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
36. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986).
37. See id. (“The question in this case is whether the California Public Utilities Com-
mission may require a privately owned utility company to include in its billing envelopes
speech of a third party with which the utility disagrees.”).
38. Id. at 9; see also id. at 15 (“The Commission’s access order also impermissibly re-
quires appellant to associate with speech with which appellant may disagree.”).
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tions as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the
choice of what not to say.”39 Why should human shareholders not en-
joy, at least, the same rights that an artificial corporation has?
Consider also that union members have greater rights than share-
holders vis-a`-vis unwanted political speech. In International Association
of Machinists v. Street, the Supreme Court held that “§ 2, Eleventh [of
the Railway Labor Act] is to be construed to deny the unions, over an
employee’s objection, the power to use his exacted funds to support
political causes which he opposes.”40 Additionally, in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, the Court held that unions cannot compel their
members to contribute to political causes with which members disa-
gree, noting that “[t]he fact that the appellants are compelled to
make, rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political
purposes works no less an infringement of their constitutional
rights.”41 As a consequence, “[s]hareholders in the corporate context
are less protected than employees in the union context, since unions
must refund the portion of agency fees [for example, union dues]
from non-member employees that are used for political activity.”42
Oddly, even though Street and Abood are in tension with Citizens United,
39. Id. at 16; see also Joo, supra note 16, at 32 (“The Court has also stated without
elaboration that business corporations have negative speech rights—the rights against be-
ing compelled to express a viewpoint—equivalent to those of individual persons.”).
40. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. S.B. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768–69 (1961). As Justice
Douglas elaborated in his concurrence:
But even such a selective use of union funds for political purposes subordinates
the individual’s First Amendment rights to the views of the majority. I do not see
how that can be done, even though the objector retains his rights to campaign, to
speak, to vote as he chooses. For when union funds are used for that purpose, the
individual is required to finance political projects against which he may be in
rebellion.
Id. at 778 (Douglas, J., concurring).
41. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977); see also id. at 235–36
(“[T]he Constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues,
or assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are
not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employ-
ment.”). See generally Comment, The Regulation of Union Political Activity: Majority and Minor-
ity Rights and Remedies, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 386, 415 (1977) [hereinafter, Comment, Union
Political] (“[T]he Abood Court held that compelled contributions by dissenters violated the
dissenters’ first amendment rights.”).
42. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 24, at 15; cf. Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, supra note 23, at
210 (“The lesson of the organizational dues cases is that the financial supporters of an
association do not give up their own First Amendment rights of freedom of association and
speech simply because they supply money to the group.”); Comment, Union Political, supra
note 41, at 388 (“Even if the tension between the state’s regulatory interest and the first
amendment rights of the union is resolved, an even more delicate question remains con-
cerning the degree to which the union’s exercise of its first amendment rights may infringe
upon the first amendment rights of its dissident members.”).
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there is no mention of either case in the opinion. Sadly, it seems as if
only Justice White’s dissent in Bellotti acknowledges this crucial incon-
sistency between unions and corporations.43
Why should corporations and union members enjoy rights that
shareholders do not? The problem runs deeper than First Amend-
ment doctrine. As Victor Brudney eloquently observes:
To permit corporate funds to be used to influence the exercise of
government power forces a person seeking profits from market
transactions, for which he must delegate decisionmaking power, to
relinquish power to determine the extent and character of govern-
mental compulsion on himself and the rest of society. It fractures
his power to influence government decisions, on a range of is-
sues—such as environmental or health and safety regulations, taxa-
tion, race relations, or the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs—
that affect his welfare and that he may oppose. It also requires him
to permit the use of his assets to support social views and generate
social attitudes that may impinge upon his individual
preferences.44
As strange as it may seem, an analogy to the famous Cohen v. Califor-
nia45 free speech case is useful:
Had Cohen, for example, known of the lettering, objected to it,
but been left with no alternative but to wear the jacket given the
cold temperature, we would not ordinarily credit him with the act
of speaking any more than we would consider burning a flag to
start a fire to keep warm an act of speaking. Similarly, had Cohen
been forced to wear the jacket against his will, perhaps by means of
a bribe or threat, we would not ordinarily conclude that the mes-
sage communicated by the jacket was his speech, as it was not a
product of his communicative free will.46
43. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 814–18 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting).
44. Brudney, supra note 18, at 264. In the words of another scholar:
Even less connected to resulting speech than political contributors are the inves-
tors in a corporation. Investors, generally, have no knowledge or intention that
their contributions to a corporation (in the form of stock and partial ownership
interests) may be used to fund political, and especially partisan, speech unrelated
to its general business interests in the name of the corporation, which they own.
Would an investor in Microsoft be willing to buy shares only on the condition that
the individual political preferences of the management be published in the inves-
tor’s name? I think it is fair to say that a corporation that placed such a condition
on investment would be shunned in the market—unless the corporation was a
known vehicle for the expression of speech on behalf of the membership, like the
ACLU or NRA and so on.
Bezanson, No Middle Ground?, supra note 6, at 666.
45. 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that Mr. Cohen’s arrest in a courthouse for wear-
ing a jacket bearing a four-letter expletive violated his rights to free speech under the First
Amendment).
46. Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 774 (1995).
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Similarly, when a corporation engages in political speech, it does not
represent its shareholders’ “free will.” Shareholders have diverse view-
points; many of them might disagree with the corporation’s political
positions.47
To make matters worse, the corporate insiders, not the corpora-
tion, are speaking.48 Yet the actual bearers of speech rights should be
the corporation’s shareholders as owners, not the managers as agents.
When a corporation engages in political speech, it violates its share-
holders’ rights. Corporate political speech could even be analogized
to expropriation, raising concerns under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.49 Going one step further, one might argue that such
political speech is de facto theft. Consider that a principal impetus
behind the first federal campaign finance law, the Tillman Act of
1907,50 was “[t]he notion that corporate managers were thieves or em-
bezzlers for spending corporate funds on election campaigns . . . [since] those
funds belonged to the policyholders.”51 It is immaterial whether such
political speech is characterized as expropriation or theft; the central
point is that shareholders’ property rights are being violated.
Ironically, while shareholders’ rights are ignored, there has been
quite an aggressive use of constitutional arguments to protect corpo-
rations. For example, both credit rating agencies trying to stave off
lawsuits for inaccurate ratings52 and companies wishing to prevent
47. This concern helped fuel the initial adoption of federal campaign finance laws
following an insurance company scandal in New York. As Adam Winkler summarizes it:
The purchase of management-protective laws was not the only evil stemming
from executives’ use of “other people’s money” in elections. To some, the greater evil
came from the forced political association of diverse owners with particular partisan or politi-
cal leanings. In corporations like insurance firms, with so many and such geo-
graphically dispersed owners, corporate general treasury funds reflected the
investments of people of every different political philosophy.
Winkler, “Other People’s Money,” supra note 23, at 896–97 (emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., Joo, supra note 16, at 72 (“Because the business judgment rule fails to
constrain managerial discretion, using it to justify managerial control over election-related
spending does not merely exalt wealth. It suggests that management’s political preferences
are more worthy of respect than those of shareholders.”); Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 24, at
15 (“the shareholder’s First Amendment right to remain silent in a political debate or to
support a candidate of his or her choosing is also at risk when a manager uses corporate
money to support political causes which are antithetical to the shareholder’s wishes”); see
also O’Kelley, supra note 19, and accompanying text. R
49. See Brudney, supra note 18, at 250 (“It is restricted because the act of utterance is,
by definition, an expropriation of the collective assets of all the owners.”).
50. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
51. Winkler, “Other People’s Money,” supra note 23, at 894 (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., Caleb Deats, Note, Talk That Isn’t Cheap: Does the First Amendment Protect
Credit Ratings Agencies’ Faulty Methodologies from Regulation?, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1818
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limited shareholder ability to nominate directors53 turned to the First
Amendment. This suggests that the First Amendment is at its most
muscular when it is part of a deregulatory agenda. Justice Rehnquist
recognized this crucial point in his dissent in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric v. Public Service Commission of New York; he warns that the major-
ity has, “by labeling economic regulation of business conduct as a re-
straint on ‘free speech,’ gone far to resurrect the discredited doctrine
of cases such as Lochner and Tyson  . . . .”54 One scholar echoes Rehn-
quist’s point well:
[T]he First Amendment principle of abstention has expanded be-
yond a program of making politics safe to become a primary vehi-
cle in a post-New Deal attempt to reduce the scope of conscious
collective control over the market. The First Amendment, under-
stood in this way as a fundamental limitation on the scope of gov-
ernment, has become the locus of a new Lochnerism—or rather, a
revival of the old Lochnerism under a new doctrinal label. The
courts have increasingly begun to use the First Amendment to re-
strict economic regulation . . . .55
In the end, one could be forgiven for comparing Citizens United to
Lochner:56 the latter invalidated regulation based on Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims;57 the former, based on the First
Amendment.58
(2010); David Segal, A Matter of Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2009, at B1 (discussing promi-
nent First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams’ representation of the credit rating agency
Standard & Poors).
53. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Bus. Roundtable,
Securities Act Release No. 9149, Exchange Act Release No. 63,031, Investment Company
Act Release No. 29,456, 2010 WL 3862548 (Oct. 4, 2010).
54. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 591
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As Frederick Schauer reminds us, “economic libertari-
ans now . . . gravitate to the First Amendment rather than to the Due Process or Contracts
Clauses . . . . They have identified and seized upon the First Amendment’s rhetorical place
in American political and legal argument, and have sought, hardly irrationally, to use this
phenomenon in support their causes.” Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amend-
ment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1809 (2004).
55. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 659, 661;
see also Brudney, supra note 18, at 295 (“[T]he First Amendment should not become the
vehicle for restoring the lenses of the Lochner court to judicial scrutiny of economic regula-
tion of either legislative or executive origin.”).
56. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidated a New York statute that
prohibited employers of bakers from allowing their employees to work in excess of ten
hours per day, sixty hours per week).
57. See id. at 53 (“The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is
part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution.”).
58. See Curtis, supra note 12, at 51 (“Citizens United . . . share[s] a number of common
themes with Lochner era jurisprudence.”). Even the rhetoric of the two opinions is eerily
similar: both rely on slippery slopes, with the purported autonomy of early twentieth-cen-
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Yet, when it comes to the basic task of protecting shareholders,
the First Amendment is seemingly nowhere to be found amid these
creative and aggressive arguments. Adam Winkler sums up the situa-
tion eloquently:
To the extent the corporation uses a shareholder’s money to sup-
port political causes he disagrees with, the shareholder may end up
feeling abused and powerless. His own money has fought against
him in the electoral arena. Yet, helplessness and being taken ad-
vantage of are hardly the character traits the Constitution was de-
signed to encourage through its First Amendment guarantee.59
Regrettably, Citizens United does not use the First Amendment to sup-
port the free speech rights of shareholders rather it restricts their use.
Deregulation has become seemingly more important than share-
holder rights.
B. Three Powerful Critiques
On the surface, there are three strong critiques that might
emerge in response to my proposal: (1) shareholders can protect
themselves through “corporate democracy”; (2) shareholders can sim-
ply divest their holdings in companies whose speech they disagree
with; and (3) corporations are not public entities against whom consti-
tutional rights may be asserted. None of these responses withstand
careful scrutiny.
tury bakers apparently similar to that of twenty-first century voters. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at
58 (“If this statute be valid, and if, therefore, a proper case is made out in which to deny
the right of an individual, sui juris, as employer or employe´, [sic] to make contracts for the
labor of the latter under the protection of the provisions of the Federal Constitution, there
would seem to be no length to which legislation of this nature might not go.”); id. at 57
(“There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to
men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights
and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with their
independence of judgment and of action.”).
59. Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, supra note 23, at 200; see, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 815–16 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“The interest which the State
wishes to protect here is identical to that which the Court has previously held to be pro-
tected by the First Amendment: the right to adhere to one’s own beliefs and to refuse to
support the dissemination of the personal and political views of others, regardless of how
large a majority they may compose.”); Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 24, at 16 (“Corporate
managers are effectively hijacking shareholder money for political spending when the
shareholders are generally under the impression that their investment will not be used for
politics. This tramples on shareholders’ free speech and associational rights by making
them unwittingly subsidize speech that they may disagree with.”).
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1. Corporate Democracy
To begin with, one might argue that the structure of corporate
law already provides means for shareholders so that they may protect
themselves against the unwanted speech of corporations. Indeed this
is the rationale that the majority trumpets in Citizens United when it
suggests that “[t]here is . . . little evidence of abuse that cannot be
corrected by shareholders ‘though the procedures of corporate de-
mocracy.’”60 Those familiar with corporate law, on the other hand,
recognize that such democracy is a “common myth.”61
While they may also sell their shares, shareholders have two pow-
ers within the structure of corporate law: voting and suing.62 Judges
versed in corporate law will admit that voting rights are notoriously
ineffectual.63 Shareholders can also sue for a violation of fiduciary du-
ties, but these seemingly impressive fiduciary obligations are, in the
end, little more than eloquent, rhetorical flourishes. Courts have
watered down these duties through the business judgment rule
(“BJR”), which presumes that “in making a business decision the di-
rectors of a corporation acted on an informed basis . . . and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests [sic] of the
company.”64 As Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine candidly ob-
serves, “corporate law generally permits corporate managers wide flex-
ibility and errs on the side of managerial freedom.”65
60. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010)  (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
794).
61. Joo, supra note 16, at 76.
62. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to
the First State as First in Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779, 781 (2004).
63. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections from Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 953, 999 (2003) (“As of now, incumbent slates are able to spend their compa-
nies’ money in an almost unlimited way in order to get themselves reelected. As a practical
matter, this renders the corporate election process an irrelevancy, unless a takeover propo-
sal is on the table and a bidder is willing to fund an insurgent slate.”).
64. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). In effect, the BJR shifts the duty
of care from negligence to gross negligence: violations are found only where there is “reck-
less indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the interests of the whole body of stock-
holders,” or actions that are without the bounds of reason. Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147
A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929). As Mark Roe notes, the BJR “has courts refusing to directly
help shareholders who attack managerial mistake.” Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 233, 235 (2002).
65. Leo E. Strine, Delaware’s Corporate-law System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite
Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the
Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1279 (2001). Delaware is the leading
jurisdiction in American corporate law. See, e.g., Why Choose Delaware as Your Corporate
Home?, DEL. DIVISION CORPS., http://www.state.de.us/corp/default.shtml (last visited Nov.
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Since “[u]nder existing legal rules, a corporation’s decision to
engage in political speech is governed by the same rules as ordinary
business decisions, which give directors and executives virtually ple-
nary authority,”66 “corporate political speech reflects the judgments of
corporate officers, and not necessarily the people whose money funds
the speech.”67 As Justice Stevens aptly points out in his dissent:
By “corporate democracy,” presumably the Court means the rights
of shareholders to vote and to bring derivative suits for breach of
fiduciary duty. In practice, however, many corporate lawyers will
tell you that “these rights are so limited as to be almost nonexis-
tent,” given the internal authority wielded by boards and managers
and the expansive protections afforded by the business judgment
rule.68
In sum, the corporate democracy defense is an illusion.
2. Shareholders Can Divest
A second seemingly seductive critique is that shareholders can
simply sell their shares if they disagree with the political speech of a
corporation whose shares they own.69 Again, this is much easier said
than done for two principal reasons. First, as Adam Winkler notes,
even assuming that shareholders know when a corporation is involved
1, 2011) (“More than 900,000 business entities have their legal home in Delaware includ-
ing more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 63% of the Fortune 500.”);
see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public
Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 318–19 (2004).
66. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 30, at 1.
67. Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, supra note 23, at 200; see also Joo, supra note 16, at 70 (“A
shareholder derivative suit, however, is a drastic and costly course of action likely to be
worthwhile only in cases of massive abuse of funds . . . . Moreover, even if shareholders
bring suit, the business judgment rule renders management’s business decisions largely
immune to judicial review.”); Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 24, at 25 (“Corporate law pro-
vides no panacea for the problem of managers’ spending corporate money on politics
because courts are very deferential to managers under the business judgment rule.”).
68. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 978 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (quoting Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 320 (1999)); see also Torres-
Spelliscy, supra note 24, at 41 (“The idea that shareholders could react to political spend-
ing about which they are unaware, or that derivative suits might be successful when so far
no modern court has punished a manager for political spending, is completely divorced from
reality.” (emphasis added)).
69. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978) (“The
critical distinction here [between corporations and unions] is that no shareholder has
been ‘compelled’ to contribute anything. Apart from the fact, noted by the dissent that
compulsion by the State is wholly absent, the shareholder invests in a corporation of his
own volition and is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason.”).
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in political speech:70 “A shareholder can sell his shares, but by then it is too
late: he has already financially supported the corporate speech with
which he disagrees. Selling shares may be a symbolic association of
disassociation, but it does nothing to prevent the corruption the state
fears.”71 Put bluntly, the harm has already been perpetrated if and
when the shareholder learns of the contested speech.72
Second, the shareholder may be unable to sell her shares for a
variety of reasons. The shares could be owned indirectly through mu-
tual funds or pension funds; as such, “[a] large number of the individ-
uals whose money is invested in corporations through these
institutional investors have little, if any, ability to control in which
companies their money is invested.”73 For instance, as Winkler ob-
serves, a shareholder:
[E]xercises virtually no control whatsoever over his pension plan;
he may be able to withdraw altogether from the plan, but there are
often penalties for doing so. How is the pensioned employee who
disagrees with the corporate speech to sell his shares? The simple
answer is that he cannot—at least not without substantial injury.74
70. Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, supra note 23, at 167–68 (“[S]hareholders simply will not
know when the corporations in which they have invested make political expenditures,
much less make them to support causes they disagree with or make them with general
treasury funds as compared to [Political Action Committees] or segregated funds.”). A
comparison of shareholders to union members is instructive:
A union member may actually be better able to discover the use of his dues than a
shareholder because he works with other dues-paying members in a union shop
where information may spread easily. While no one would deny that the penalty
to a union member who must quit his job to avoid the unwanted political use of
his dues is greater than any faced by a dissenting shareholder, the latter faces
problems associated with limited control and limited knowledge that make divest-
ment an utterly ineffective remedy for unwanted corporate electoral spending.
Id. at 205.
71. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
72. See also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (“Even assuming that [shareholders] reliably learn as much . . . [t]he injury to
the shareholders’ expressive rights has already occurred . . . .”).
73. Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1268
(1999); see also Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 24, at 8–9 (“Moreover, because so many share-
holders hold their shares through intermediaries like mutual funds, corporations and their
shareholders are strangers. The shareholder may not know their holdings day-to-day and
the corporation does not know who owns it day-to-day. This distance between corporate
managers and beneficial owners magnifies corporate agency problems.” (footnote
omitted)).
74. Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, supra note 23, at 167; cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[Shareholders] might have pre-
ferred to keep the corporation’s stock in their portfolio for any number of economic rea-
sons; and they may incur a capital gains tax or other penalty from selling their shares,
changing their pension plan, or the like.”).
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Given the move away from defined benefit to defined contribution
retirement plans, virtually all workers are now investors who have no
choice but to maintain assets in the stock market if they wish to obtain
even a modest return on capital for their retirement.  To argue that
they can monitor the speech of corporations, in which they invest, and
adjust their portfolios accordingly, is at best fanciful.75
3. Corporations Are Not State Actors
The third and most sophisticated critique is that it is difficult to
conceive of First Amendment rights for shareholders, given that cor-
porations are not public actors against whom constitutional rights are
typically asserted.76 Even this rationale is left wanting.
This critique simply misses the point. The real question is
whether the government should have the power to pass statutes that
protect shareholders’ constitutional rights—in this case, the First
Amendment rights. To the extent that the answer is that the govern-
ment should have such power, then whether a corporation is “public”
or “private” is almost irrelevant.77
There are several additional reasons why the lack of state action
argument is unconvincing. First, corporations, whose charters are
granted by the state, are technically creations of the state.78 While it
has become fashionable to deemphasize this state grant and rely in-
stead on theorizing the corporation as an “association” of individuals
75. As Adolf Berle observed nearly sixty years ago:
Protection of life, liberty and property contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, though speaking the old language of possessory property and of
individuals defending themselves against arbitrary feudal government, does at
least set up the implication that corresponding protection exists where the individ-
ual derives his economic life not from possessory property, but from position in a modern
industrial world.
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal Rights
from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 942 (1952) [hereinafter Berle,
Constitutional Limitations] (emphasis added).
76. See generally Stefan J. Padfield, Finding State Action When Corporations Govern, 82
TEMP. L. REV. 703 (2009).
77. Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 814 (1978) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (“Presumably, unlike the situations presented by Street and Abood [union shop cases],
the use of funds invested by shareholders with opposing views by Massachusetts corpora-
tions in connection with referenda or elections would not constitute state action and, con-
sequently, would not violate the First Amendment. Until now, however, the States have always
been free to adopt measures designed to further rights protected by the Constitution even when not
compelled to do so.” (emphasis added)).
78. As the first Justice Marshall once famously noted, a “corporation is an artificial
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.” Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
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or even an anthromorphic “real entity,”79 it is difficult to deny the
fundamental reality that corporations “are created by the State as a
means of furthering the public welfare.”80 As such, “[t]he private prac-
tice of a corporation (or apparently any aggregate body) taken under
or in furtherance of a privilege granted by the state falls within the
area of constitutional control.”81 To the extent that shareholders
might be analogized to union members, it is worthwhile to note that
the U.S. Supreme Court has found a state action in union shop agree-
ments.82 In sum, one response to the lack of state action critique is
that “the corporation, itself a creation of the state, is as subject to con-
stitutional limitations which limit action as is the state itself.”83
Beyond this technical response, it is important to consider
whether many corporations have become so powerful that their share-
holders—who, in all likelihood, depend on them for economic well-
being even more than they do on the government—should be given
constitutional protections. As Berle forcefully notes:
It is here submitted that a corporation or concentrate of corpora-
tions, so situated that it has power seriously to affect the individual
life of a patron or customer, has become an arm of the state so that
its actions are reviewable to determine whether or not they accord
79. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To Be or Not to Be? Citizens United and the Corporate
Form 25 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 10-005,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546087 (“Why does the real entity view pre-
vail? In part, this is no doubt due to the fact that it represents the most congenial view to
corporate management, because it shields them from undue interference from both share-
holders and the state.”).
80. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 818 (White, J., dissenting).
81. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 75, at 951; see also id. at 952 (“Implicitly,
it would seem, state action in granting a corporate charter assumes that the corporation
will not exercise its power (granted in theory at least to forward a state purpose) in a
manner forbidden the state itself.”).
82. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226 (1977); see also Comment,
Union Political, supra note 41, at 415 (“The requisite state action was found in Abood because
local governments, as employers, entered into the disputed agency shop agreements under
a statutory authorization.”). Adam Winkler makes the following general observation:
In practice, the role of the state in each of these circumstances is similar: state law
grants an organization the right to charge members for joining and the organiza-
tion in turn attempts to spend that money on political speech. In the union dues
cases, state law allows the union to set dues; in state bar fee cases, state law allows
the bar to charge membership fees; in student fees cases, state law allows the
university to charge student activity fees; in corporate speech cases, state law al-
lows the corporation to charge individuals for the privilege of investing.
Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, supra note 23, at 209.
83. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 75, at 942.
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with the constitutional limitations and requirements imposed on
states.84
In parallel, one should also think broadly about the goals of the First
Amendment. As Justice Douglas notes in his concurrence in Street:
This means that membership in a group cannot be conditioned on
the individual’s acceptance of the group’s philosophy. Otherwise,
First Amendment rights are required to be exchanged for the
group’s attitude, philosophy, or politics. I do not see how that is
permissible under the Constitution. Since neither Congress nor
the state legislatures can abridge those rights, they cannot grant
the power to private groups to abridge them. As I read the First
Amendment, it forbids any abridgement by government whether
directly or indirectly.85
Such a perspective also accords with constitutional history. As Adolf
Berle wryly observes:
Had the question come up, let us say, in 1800, when there were
only 300 recorded corporations in the United States, all of which
derived their authority from the states or predecessor colonies, the
lawyer arguing that they were purely private and, because private,
not within the scope of constitutional limitations on governmental
action would have had the difficult side of the argument.86
Technical considerations, as well as policy and historical ones, counsel
that it would be too facile to dismiss the constitutional rights of share-
holders on the simplistic theory that corporations are private actors.87
Conclusion
As Victor Brudney presciently warned thirty years ago:
Regardless of whether increased corporate participation in the so-
cial and political life of the nation is desirable as a matter of policy,
84. A. A. Berle, Jr., The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 639,
657 (1952) [hereinafter Berle, Developing Law].
85. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. S.B. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 777 (1961) (Douglas, J., con-
curring) (footnote omitted); see also Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, supra note 23, at 203 (“In the
context of the First Amendment, it has been held that individuals should not be forced to
support political ideas they do not believe. Although the relevant cases have arisen out of
legal controversies involving state action, judges and Justices have based their reasoning on
the maxim that coerced political speech, by its very nature, offends First Amendment
values.”).
86. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 75, at 945; cf. Curtis, supra note 12, at
32 (“Changes that empower private power to control dialogue can be a major threat to free
speech’s historic and functional ideals.”).
87. Cf. Berle, Developing Law, supra note 84, at 658 (“The thrust of the doctrine here
propounded is precisely that where the corporation by reason of size or of degree of con-
centration has acquired power giving it the capacity to impede personality or personal life
it has become, tanto qanto, an arm of the state both because it is a state chartered corpora-
tion and because it is relied on by the community as a necessary part of its economic
function.”).
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serious doubts exist regarding the validity of the constitutional support thus
given to that movement. That support could significantly reduce the
regulatory power of government over an institution whose exis-
tence is uniquely a function of government authorization, whose
power and wealth often far exceed those of the government that
created it, and that has long been a subject of pervasive govern-
ment regulation.88
It is crucial to remember that “[i]n its origins the free speech system
was anti-hierarchical: it empowered many diverse voices to speak, cele-
brated multiple perspectives, and limited the power of the privileged
few to dominate the discourse. The political system was designed to
serve the interests of ‘the People.’”89 By contrast, as Justice Stevens
observes in his Citizens United dissent, “[t]he Court’s blinkered and
aphoristic approach to the First Amendment may well promote corpo-
rate power at the cost of the individual and collective self-expression
the Amendment was meant to serve.”90 What is particularly regrettable
about Citizens United is the use of the Constitution to further entrench
already powerful members of society—the corporate elite.
With seductive rhetoric, the majority in Citizens United warns of
how upholding § 203 of the BCRA would lead society down a path of
“censorship to control thought.”91 To the extent there is a “slippery
slope,”92 however, perhaps it runs in precisely the opposite direction
than the majority suggests.  What are the limits, if any, of corporate
insiders to arrogate shareholder wealth where the Supreme Court ef-
fectively condones coerced speech? Put in James Madison’s eight-
eenth-century prose, “[w]ho does not see . . . [t]hat the same
88. Brudney, supra note 18, at 236 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); cf. First Nat’l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“It has long been
recognized, however, that the special status of corporations has placed them in a position
to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only
the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral process.”).
89. Curtis, supra note 12, at 3.
90. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 977 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 908 (majority opinion); see also id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]f
speech can be prohibited because, in the view of the Government, it leads to ‘moral decay’
or does not serve ‘public ends,’ then there is no limit to the Government’s censorship
power.”).
92. As one commentator observes with respect to “slippery slope” rhetoric:
Its proponents for the most part gesture toward a vaguely articulated fear of an
erosion of democratic self-rule and the freedoms it secures, and often seem to
stop there without specifying how exactly permitting, say, limitations on the
amount candidates can contribute to their own campaigns is likely to launch us
on an irreversible path to a collapse of democratic self-governance.
James A. Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the
Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 673, 691 (2011) (footnote omitted).
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authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of
his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him
to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?”93
This sorry state of affairs only exacerbates the erosion of share-
holder capitalism.94 In the end, we would be wise to heed Berle’s
warning:
History appears to exhibit a cycle in which social organization is
sometimes dominated by organization and ascendant power, and
at other times by highly individualized life with a high degree of
individualized possessory property. The core of the feudal system
rested not on property but on power. This was gradually dispersed:
the collectivized power of the feudal dukes dissipated into the indi-
vidual titles of tiny landholders in the nineteenth century. The in-
dustrial era appears to have compelled a large measure of
recollectivization of property . . . . In great areas, we have moved away
from the individual and possessory property stage into a stage of great or-
ganization. But organization, economic as well as political, turns on
power, not on title. Protection of individual liberty might possibly be carried
out by impeding or preventing recollectivization of economic function with
its attendant increase of power in private or public hands or in both work-
ing together.95
In their most promising incarnation, First Amendment rights for
shareholders would not only counteract the ever-expansive rights
given to corporate insiders under the guise of “corporate speech,” but
may also promise an avenue toward preventing the “recollectivization
of economic function” and fostering the “protection of individual
liberty.”
93. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
94. As the mutual fund pioneer, John Bogle, laments:
[C]apitalism has been moving in the wrong direction. We need to reverse its
course so that the system is once again run in the interest of stockholder-owners
rather than in the interest of managers.
. . . .
Our society today, then, is no longer an “ownership society.” It has become and
“intermediation society,” and it is not going back.
JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM, at xi (2005).
95. Berle, Developing Law, supra note 84, at 660 (emphasis added).
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